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Abstract
We develop a dynamic multi-agent model of an interbank payment
system where banks choose their level of available funds on the basis of
private payoff maximisation. The model consists of the repetition of a
simultaneous move stage game with incomplete information, incomplete
monitoring, and stochastic payoffs. Adaptation takes place with bayesian
updating, with banks maximizing immediate payoffs. We carry out nu-
merical simulations to solve the model and investigate two special sce-
narios: an operational incident and exogenous throughput guidelines for
payment submission. We find that the demand for intraday credit is an
S-shaped function of the cost ratio between intraday credit costs and the
costs associated with delaying payments. We also find that the demand for
liquidity is increased both under operational incidents and in the presence
of effective throughput guidelines.
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1 Introduction
Virtually all economic activity is facilitated by transfers of claims towards public
or private financial institutions. The settlement of claims between banks takes to
a large extent place at the central bank, in central bank money. These interbank
payment systems transfer vast amounts of funds, and their smooth operation is
critical for the functioning of the whole financial system. In 2004, the annual
value of interbank payments made in the European TARGET was around $552
trillion, in the US Fedwire system $470 trillion, and in the UK CHAPS $59
trillion - tens of times the value of their respective gross domestic products (BIS
2006). These transfers originate from customer requests, and from the banks’
proprietary operations in e.g. foreign exchange, securities and the interbank
money market. The sheer size of these transfers, and their centrality for the
functioning of a number of markets, make the mechanisms that regulate these
fluxes and the incentives that generate them interesting to policy makers and
regulators.
At present most payment systems work on a real-time gross settlement
(RTGS) or equivalent modality. In RTGS payments are settled continuously
and individually throughout the day with immediate finality. To cover the pay-
ments banks generally use their reserve balances, access intraday credit from
the central bank or use incoming funds from payments from other banks. The
first two sources carry an (opportunity) cost which gives banks incentives to
economize on their use. We call these funds liquidity. The third source, on the
other hand, is dependent by the liquidity decisions of other banks. The less
liquidity a bank commits for settlement, the more dependent it is from incom-
ing payments - and may thus need to delay its own payments until these funds
arrive, causing the receivers of its payments to receive funds later. If also delays
are costly, each bank faces a trade-off between liquidity costs and delay costs.
Both aspects are dependent on the banks own liquidity decision, but the latter
is also dependent on the liquidity decisions by other banks.
This paper develops a dynamic model to study this trade-off. The model
consists of a sequence of independent settlement days where a set of homogenous
banks make payments to each other. Each of these days is a simultaneous-move
game (or a stage game) in which banks choose their level of liquidity for payment
processing. At the end of the day they receive a stochastic payoff determined
by the amount of liquidity they committed and delays they experienced. Due
to the nature of the settlement process, the payoff function is a random variable
unknown to the banks. In this context, a reasonable assumption is that banks
use heuristic, bounded-rational like rules to adapt their behaviour over time.
Hence, we simulate a learning process taking place over many days, until banks
settle down in equilibria. We are interested in the properties of the equilib-
ria in aggregate terms, i.e. in the behaviour of the system as the product of
independent, single agents’ private payoff maximization.
Given its game-theoretic approach, this paper is related to recent work by
Angelini (1998), Bech and Garratt (2003, 2006), Buckle and Campbell (2003)
and Willison (2004). These study various ”liquidity management games” with
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few (typically, two) agents and few (typically, three) periods. There, however,
the payoff function is common knowledge. Due to the complex mechanics taking
place in real payment systems this is likely to be unrealistic. Recent work
by Beyeler et al. (2007) on the relationship between instruction arrival and
payment settlement in a similar setting shows that with low liquidity, payment
settlement gets coupled across the network and is governed by the dynamics
of the queue - and largely unpredictable when a large number of payments
are made. The present paper makes an effort to model this complexity; in a
similar spirit, it also considers a large number of banks, which settle payments
in a continuous-time day, and which interact over a long sequence of settlement
days.
Recently, a growing literature has used simulation techniques to investigate
the effects e.g. of failures in complex payment systems (see eg. BoE (2004),
Leinonen (2005), Devriese and Mitchell (2005)). These studies generally use
historical payment data and simulate banks’ risk exposures under alternative
scenarios, or ways to improve liquidity efficiency of the systems. The shortcom-
ing of this approach has been that the behaviour of banks is not endogenously
determined. It is either assumed to remain unchanged or to change in a prede-
termined manner.
The present paper tries to overcome some of the shortcomings of both ”game
theoretic” and ”simulation” approaches by modelling banks as learning agents.
Agents who learn about each others’ actions through repeated interaction is a
recurring theme in evolutionary game theory. In one strand of the literature1 the
agents know their payoff function, and learn about others’ behaviour. They do
so playing the stage game repeatedly, while choosing their actions on the basis
of adaptive rules of the type ”choose a best reply to the current strategy profile”
or ”choose a best reply to the next expected strategy profile”. Results obtained
in this strand cannot be immediately applied here: banks cannot choose best
replies as they do not know their payoff function. A second research line does
not require knowledge of the payoff function on the part of the learners; they
are instead of the kind ”adopt more frequently an action that has produced
a high payoff in the past”. The main results of this literature are about the
convergence (or non-convergence) of actions to equilibria of the stage game.
The approach adopted here is close to the latter. However, because the pay-
offs are calculated on the basis of a settlement algorithm, we cannot analytically
calculate the equilibria ex-ante, and then demonstrate convergence (or the lack
of it). Instead, we show convergence by means of simulations, inferring then
that the attraction points are equilibria of the stage game - in a sense that
we make precise. Because the payoff function is stochastic and unknown, the
problem of each optimizing bank lends itself to a heuristic approach. From this
perspective, our work bears strong links to the reinforcement learning litera-
ture2. From an individual agent’s perspective it relates it relates to operations
research, where a typical problem is that of maximizing an unknown function.
1E.g. fictitious play, following Brown (1951)
2See Sutton and Barto (1998) for an overview. For Q-Learning, a common reinforcement
learning technique, see Watkins and Dayan (1992).
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However, in our setting the environment is not static: through time, actions
yield different payoffs both because the payoff function is random, and because
the other agents change their behaviour.
The model is rich enough to investigate a number of policy issues; here, we
focus on the aggregate liquidity of the system. As a first result we derive a
liquidity demand function, relating total funds to the ratio of delay to liquidity
costs. This function is found to be increasing to the relative cost of delay,
and S-shaped. Then, we look at the effect of operational incidents affecting
random participants of the system. We find that banks would generally prefer
to commit more liquidity in case the disruption were known - except from the
extreme cases of very low and very high delay costs. Throughput guidelines
for payment submission are a common used by system-designers to reduce risk
in payment systems;3 we look at the effect of one such rule on liquidity usage
and find that at sufficiently low delay costs banks would increase their liquidity
holdings to contain delays. Finally, we explore some efficiency issues, namely
whether smaller systems are more or less liquidity efficient than large ones. We
find that a system with a smaller number of banks uses less liquidity for a given
level of payment activity.
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 develops a formal description of
the model and the agents’ learning process, and describes the payoff function.
Section 3 presents the results of the experiments and section 4 concludes.
2 Description of the model
2.1 Stage game and its repetition
The model consists of N agents indexed by i = 1...N , who repeatedly play a
stage game Γ = 〈A, pi1, pi2, ...piN 〉. Here A = {0, 1, ...K} is the (common) finite
action set for each agent, and pii : A
N → F is i’s outcome function, which
maps the set of action profiles into a set of payoff distribution functions. That
is, given the action profile a ∈ AN , agent i receives a stage-game payoff drawn
from a univariate distribution pii (a), whose shape depends on N parameters -
the stage game action profile. To keep the exposition uncluttered, we leave the
precise form of the outcome function pii (.) undefined at the stage. Details are
given in Section 3.1, where we also give a precise economic interpretation to the
abstract entities introduced here. Information in the game is incomplete as the
outcome function pi (.) is unknown to the agents. Agents are risk-neutral, so
they care about the expected payoff. Hence, bank i will only be concerned with
its payoff functions fi (a) = E (pii (a)).
The stage game Γ is repeated through discrete time, running from t = 0 to
(potentially) infinity. The action profile chosen in stage game t is denoted by
a (t) = {a1 (t) , a2 (t) , ..., aN (t)}. A particular realization of the payoff vector
3A throughput guideline is a constraint imposed on banks’ behaviour by the system regu-
lator; typically, it demands that certain percentages of the total daily payments be executed
by given deadlines within the day.
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drawn from pi (a (t)), is indicated by y (t) ∈ RN , which is therefore also called
the ”game-t payoff”.
Monitoring is incomplete. At the beginning of (stage-) game t, each agent i
knows the following: all its own previous choices and realized payoffs, and some
statistics of other’s past choices a−i (k). A (observed) history (by i at time
t) is thus denoted by hti = {ai (k) , yi (k) , a−i (k)}k=0..t−1. Let us call Ht the
set of all possible histories that i may observe up to t, and let us define H =
∪Ht. Differently from the literature on repeated games, but more in line with
that on evolutionary game theory, we assume that agents aim at maximizing
immediate payoffs (instead of e.g. the discounted stream of payoffs). That
is, histories are essential to learn about payoffs and about others’ actions, but
agents disregard strategic spillover effects between stage games. This seems a
sensible assumption here: the complexity of the environment makes it unlikely
that agents anticipate all interactions.4
2.2 Information, learning and strategies
Agent i faces two forms of uncertainty: uncertainty about the payoff function
given others’ actions, and uncertainty about other’s actions. The first element
gives to our model a flavour of decision theory, the second one is a game theory
issue.
2.2.1 Information
As time goes by and histories are updated, agents can be seen to accumulate
information. More formally, we posit that of the whole history observed up to t
each i retains some multi-dimensional statistics, say ℘i (t). These are the beliefs
about the state of the environment that i is learning, and it constitutes the basis
for the definition of strategies. Here, ℘i (t) is composed of two parts:
a) an ”estimate” f˜ ti (.) of the payoff function fi (a) = E [yi |a ];5
b) an ”estimate” p˜ti (.) of probabilities for other agents’ actions in the next
stage game.
Of a whole action profile a, i only observes its own action ai and a statistic
a−i which correlates with a−i. Hence, we assume that the estimate f˜
t
i (.) assigns
to each (ai, a−i) an expected payoff. As for the estimate b), each i is assumed
to maintain static expectations about others’ actions. That is, i believes that
a−i is drawn from a time-invariant distribution, as if other agents were adopting
a constant mixed strategy. We adopt this assumption, a classic in evolutionary
game theory, because it is simple and because it yielded the same results as some
4In the realm of reinforcement learning, immediate payoff maximisation where actions are
associated with situations is referred after Barto, Sutton and Brouwer (1981) as associative
search.
5Risk-neutral players are only interested in the expected value of payoffs, so there is no
gain in assuming that ef instead maps actions into payoff probability distributions.
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more sophisticated forms of beliefs.6 Because action profiles that generate the
same statistic a−i are indistinguishable to i, the estimate p˜
t
i (.) also refers to a−i
instead of ai. In the simulation, we posit that a−i is the average action of the
”other” agents, which clearly takes values in [0,K]. So, approximating to the
nearest integer, p˜ti (a−i) is a vector with K entries, collecting the probabilities
of any of the (other agents’) average action being played.
2.2.2 Learning
The information stored in f˜ ti (.) and p˜
t
i (.) is updated as time goes by, according
to learning rules. A learning rule for agent i, denoted by Λi, assigns to each
observed history ht−1i an updated ℘i (t).
Define Ik (ai, a−i) as the indicator function equal to 1 if action profile (ai, a−i)
appears at time k and zero otherwise. We use the following learning rule:
f˜ ti (ai, a−i) =
∑
k=0...t−1 yi (k) Ik (ai, a−i)∑
k=0...t−1 Ik (ai, a−i)
(1)
p˜ti (a−i) =
1 +
∑
k=1...t−1 Ik (a−i)
t+K
(2)
In words, f˜ ti (ai, a−i) is the average payoff obtained under action profile
(ai, a−i) up until time t excluded. Similarly, the components of the vector
p˜ti (a−i) are calculated according to the observed frequencies, starting from an
initial estimate 1/N . This is known as the ”fictitious play” updating rule start-
ing from a uniform estimate; it corresponds to Bayesian updating of beliefs
about a constant, unknown distribution over the other agents’ actions.7
2.2.3 Strategies
A strategy for i is a map assigning to each ℘i(t) an action to be taken, i.e.
some ai (t). A particular strategy can be seen as motivated by some ”rationale”,
resting in turn on the basis of a learning process which we now describe.
Each i is risk-neutral and aims at maximizing the expected immediate payoff.
Because i believes that the opponents play a particular a−i with probability
p˜ti (a−i), its strategy dictates:
ai (t+ 1) = argmax
ai
E
[
f˜ ti (ai, a−i)
∣∣p˜ti ]
= argmax
ai
∑
a−i
f˜ ti (ai, a−i) p˜
t
i (a−i) (3)
The fact that banks maximize their immediate payoff is only one of the
many possible preference specifications. Alternatively, agents might also be
6We explored in particular the possibility that players believe that the opponents’ actions
follow a Markov process. In this case, the estimate under 2) is a transition matrix, containing
the probabilities of a particular a−i being played at t+ 1, conditional on a = (ai, a−i) being
observed at t.
7See e.g. Fudenberg and Levine (1998) pg. 31 for details.
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Figure 1: Information, learning and strategies
taking into consideration future payoffs. In this case, however, optimal strate-
gies would be far more complex. Indeed, discounting expected future payoffs
would create an implicit trade-off between exploitation (the use of actions that
appear optimal in the light of the available information), and exploration (the
use of seemingly sub-optimal actions, which might appear such because of lack
of experimentation). Our preference specification severs this payoff-related link
between stage games, which nevertheless are interrelated because learning takes
place across them. This short-sighted maximization assumption is common in
the bounded-rationality and evolutionary game theory literature.8
Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between histories, information and strate-
gies. A history up to t− 2 is summarized in ℘i(t− 1). This, along with the new
data obtained in t − 1, is updated into ℘i (t) by the learning rule Λi. In turn
℘i (t), which is the information available at t, is mapped by a strategy si, to an
action ai (t).
It should be noted that in early repetitions of the stage game, p˜ti is heavily
influenced by the initial (arbitrary) estimate, for which we simply use 1/K,
while f˜ ti (.) is the average of a few observed payoffs only. Hence, strict adoption
of Eq. 3 would most likely yield, and possibly lock into, sub-optimal actions.
To avoid this, we suppose that agents first randomly choose a certain number of
actions to explore the environment, and then start making choices as in Eq. 3
- which we call ”informed decisions”. To ensure further exploration, each agent
also tries itself out at least once every a−i that it encounters. This models
8Fudenberg and Levine (1998) contains an authoritative review of models with myopic
agents. To quote only some of these seminal contributions, see i) the literature on Fictitious
Play by Brown (1951), Foster et al. (1998), and Krishna et al. (1998), ii) the literature on
learning and bounded rationality inc. Kandori et al. (1993), Young (1993), Ellison (2003),
and Blume (1993), iii) studies on Imitation and Social Learning by e.g. Schlag (1994).
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learning from other agents.
These choices on the length of the ”exploration phase” are evidently arbi-
trary; however, in the model there are clearly no exploration costs, so the length
of the exploration period can indeed be assumed exogenously. On the other
hand, some limit to exploration must be imposed, as the sheer size of the action
spaces inhibits a brute force approach, whereby i collects a very large sample
of all possible action profiles (and respective payoffs) before making informed
decisions.9
2.3 Specification of the payoff function
The model of learning about an unknown stochastic payoff function that is
determined party by the agent’s own actions and partly by the actions of other
agents can lend itself to a number of applications. The specification of the payoff
function fi ties it to the problem of a payment system analyzed in this paper.
One possible specification of f could be a simple analytical function of the
players’ actions. The problem would then become that of analyzing the lim-
iting behaviour of the learning rules and strategies, something that could be
done analytically, provided f is simple enough. However, in quest of increased
realism in payment system modelling we specify f via an algorithm represent-
ing a ”settlement day” with a large number of daily payments. To understand
why realistic analytical functions are difficult to develop, consider the follow-
ing: imagine first that banks have always enough liquidity to make payments
instantaneously. In this case payments flow undisturbed, delay costs are zero,
and only liquidity costs matter. Their calculation is trivial. However, if banks
commit less funds for settlement (as banks want to minimize costs), it becomes
more likely that the funds are at some point insufficient for banks to execute
payments immediately. As shown in Beyeler et al.. (2006), these liquidity short-
ages cause payments to occur in ”cascades”, whose length and frequency bears
no correlation with the instruction arrival process that regulates payment in-
structions as the settlement of payments becomes coupled across the network
when incoming funds allow the bank to release previously queued payment. As
a consequence, the flow of liquidity and thus delay times for individual banks
become largely unpredictable.
In the model ai represents any external funding decision by the bank. The
funds allow the bank to execute payment instructions, which the bank receives
throughout the day according to a random process. Banks have costs for both
committing liquidity for settlement, and from experiencing delays in payment
processing due to insufficient funds. The settlement day is modelled in contin-
uous time, with time indexed as t ∈ [0, T ].10 At any time interval dt, bank
9In the simulations, each i chooses among 40 possible actions, and 40 are the possible
average actions by the ”others” (a−i). Thus, full exploration would require observing 402 =
1600 different action profiles (ai, a−i), each of which should be sampled enough times to obtain
a reliable estimate of f (.).
10In the previous section, t indicizes ”days”, but we feel there is no risk of confusion, as
Section 2 and the present are relatively independent.
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i receives an instruction to pay 1 unit to any other bank j with probability
1
N
1
N−1
dt. Because there are N such banks i, and N − 1 ”other” banks j, the
arrival of payment instructions in the whole system is a Poisson process with
parameter 1 so that, on the average day, T payment instructions are generated.
Payments are executed using available liquidity; i’s available liquidity at
time t is defined as:
li (t) = ai +
∫ t
s=0
(yi (s)− xi (s)) ds
where xi (s) (viz. yi (s)) is the amount of i’s sent (viz. received) payments
at time s. For simplicity, we assume that every i adopts the following payment
rule:11
at each t, execute instructions using First-in-First-out (FIFO) as long as li (t) > 0;
else, queue received instructions (4)
We assume that a payment instruction received by bank at t and executed
at t′ carries a cost equal to
CD = κ
(t′ − t)
T
κ > 0 (5)
where κ is the ”daily interest cost” of delaying payments. Similarly, liquidity
costs (e.g. opportunity cost of collateral) are linear:
CL = λai, λ > 0 (6)
Finally, the stage game payoff is the sum of the costs in Eq. 5 and those
in Eq. 6, the former summed up over all i′s delayed payments.
3 Experiments
3.1 Parameters and equilibria
The continuous-time settlement day is modelled as a sequence of 104 time units
indexed t ∈ [0, 104]. Given that the arrival of payment instructions is a Poisson
process with parameter 1, on average banks receive a total of 104 payment
instructions per day. A sequence of days (stage games) is called a play. In the
simulations, we terminate a play when no bank changes its liquidity commitment
decision for 10 consecutive days (convergence). We run 30 plays for each set of
model parameters and find that convergence always occurs.
Banks start the adaptation process with random decisions for liquidity, and
gradually accumulate information on the shape of the payoff function. When
11The rule under (4) is evidently optimal for the cost specification given here. As banks
need to pay upfront for liquidity, they have no incentive to delay payments if liquidity is
available. Under other cost specifications (e.g. priced credit or heterogeneous payment delay
costs) this would, however, not be the case.
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enough information has been collected, banks adopt the rule described in Eq.
3 for making decisions on liquidity to commit. A series of stage games is ended
in the simulations when no bank changes its collateral posting decision for 10
consecutive games. This means that at this point, no bank wishes to change its
action, given the information available and given other banks’ actions.12
Suppose that the payoff function were known by the banks; given our spec-
ification of strategies, it would then be clear that the converged-to actions are
a Nash equilibrium of the stage game.13 We cannot quite draw the same con-
clusion in our setting: the payoff exploration is necessarily partial, so it might
be that some profitable actions were never tested enough to be recognized as
such. Hence, the equilibria converged to are only ”partial”-Nash equilibria, or
Nash-equilibria conditional on the ”partial” information that banks have about
the payoff function. However, as we discuss later, we observe a clear consistency
in learning. This suggests that the partiality of the information collected is suf-
ficient, and the equilibria reached are probably good approximations of the true
stage-game Nash equilibria.
The base system consists of 15 banks. In section 3.2 we investigate the
impact of the system size. Banks choose their action, ai among forty different
levels, ranging from 0 to 80 in intervals of 2. The cost functions are as in Eq. 5
and Eq. 6. We normalize liquidity costs at λ = 1 and look at different values
of delay costs κ ranging from 1/8 to 512 in multiples of 4. We are interested in
the demand for liquidity (i.e. in the choices of ai) at different values of κ, and
in the resulting settlement delays and payoffs.
3.2 Base experiment
As expected, with low delay costs banks tend to commit low amounts of liquidity
(∼50 units) and delay payments instead, and at high cost of delay bank prefer
to commit plenty of liquidity (∼1044 units) in order to avoid expensive delays.
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate typical evolution of the simulations for two extreme
levels of delay costs. The sudden changes in liquidity correspond to the point
where banks start making informed decisions (see Section 2.2.3).
We find that convergence always occurs - on an aggregate level within a
narrow range. A priori, learning might be sensitive to initial observations, and
hence it might be subjected to drastic differences in the final ”conclusions”. The
consistency of the learning process is illustrated in Figure 4, where we plot the
converged-to value of
∑
ai (i.e. the total liquidity committed) across plays, for
different parameter specifications. Due to randomness - which makes histories
necessarily different - the ”learned” liquidity level
∑
ai clearly differ, but they
do so within small ranges.
12While some changes in actions may occur due to the randomness of payoffs and learning,
these did not qualitatively change the results in simulations with longer convergence criteria.
13This simple property of Fictitious Play stems from the fact that, if for all t > t′ the action
profile is some constant a, then the estimates epi converge to the true value
1
N
Σai. Strategies
prescribe playing a best reply to epi so, if a were not a Nash Equilibrium, sooner or later one
player would choose some a′
i
6= ai.
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Figure 3: Total liquidity - high delay costs
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Figure 4: Total equilibrium liquidity across plays
It should be noted that while the system consistently ”learns” the same level
of total liquidity, this can represent many configurations of single banks’ liquidity
choices. Hence, our simulation don’t show that always the same equilibrium
is reached; rather, that the equilibria that are reached are characterized by
a narrow span of total liquidity in the system. Given the symmetry of the
model, it is clear that for any equilibrium (i.e. any equilibrium profile of actions
(a1, a2...aN )), there are many other equilibria obtained via a permutation of
the actions between the players that yield to same total liquidity on the system
level.
Another interesting feature of the model is its ability to match a well known
empirical fact: a low ratio of available liquidity to daily payments (”netting
ratio”), which in turn implies high levels of liquidity recycling. Because the
system processes on average 10.000 payments a day, the above results imply
that the ratio in our simulation is between 0.5% and 10.4%. For comparison,
CHAPS Sterling’s netting ratio is 15% (James 2004)14 and in Fedwire as low
as 2.2%.15 The real netting ratios are bound to be higher due to the fact that
payments in them are of varying sizes in contrast to the more fluid unit size
payments modelled here.
Figure 5 shows the equilibrium demand for intraday credit as a function of
the cost ratio. This function is S-shaped in the exponential delay cost scale, that
14Calculated as the ratio of collateral used for intraday credit to the value of payment
settled.
15in 2001. Calculated as (balances + mean overdrafts) / total value. Sources:
www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/fedwire
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Figure 5: Liquidity as a function of delay costs
is, it is relatively flat at both low and high levels of delay costs. At comparatively
low delay costs banks evidently commit little liquidity; hence the return for
increasing liquidity holdings are high, and so a little more liquidity suffices to
cope with increased delay costs. As a consequence, for low delay cost levels the
demand curve is flat. Consider now the situation with high delay costs. There,
the liquidity committed is high and returns to increasing liquidity are low, so
one might think that an increase in delay costs calls for high extra amounts
of liquidity. However, this is not the case, because gains from liquidity indeed
diminish above a certain level when all payments can be made promptly. Hence,
for high delay costs, liquidity demand is insensitive to further increases in delay
costs, and the demand curve is flat again. In between these two extremes, the
demand for liquidity increases exponentially with delay costs.
We find that delays in the system increase exponentially as banks reduce
the amount of liquidity when this is relatively expensive compared to delaying
payments. The phenomenon is known as ”deadweight losses” (Angelini 1998) or
”gridlocks” (Bech and Sorama¨ki 2002) in payment systems. Figure 6 shows the
relationship between system liquidity and payment delays. In intuitive terms,
the reason of this exponential pattern is the following. First, a bank that reduces
its liquidity holdings might have to delay its outgoing payments. Second, as a
consequence, the receivers of the delayed payments may in turn need to delay
their own payments, causing further downstream delays and so on. Hence, a
decrease of a unit of liquidity may cause multiple units to be delays. Third,
such a chain of delays - and hence this multiplicative effect - is more likely and
13
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Figure 6: Delays as a function of liquidity
longer, the lower the liquidity possessed by the banks. Thus the total effect of
liquidity reduction acts in a compounded (exponential) fashion.
An interesting question is how good the performance of the banks is in
absolute terms. To understand this we compare the payoffs received by the
banks through adaptation with two extreme strategies:
a) all banks delay all payments to the end of the day;
b) all banks commit enough liquidity to be able to process all payments
promptly.16
The comparison between the performance of these two pure strategies and
the learned strategy is shown in Figure 7. For any cost ratio, the adaptive
banks obtain better payoffs than any of the two extreme strategies - except for
the case with high liquidity costs when the costs are equal. Banks manage to
learn a convenient trade-off between delay and liquidity costs. On the contrary,
the strategy under a) becomes quickly very expensive as delay costs increase,
and the strategy under b) is exceedingly expensive when delays are not costly.
3.3 Impact of network size
In order to investigate the impact of system size on the results presented in the
previous section, we ran simulations varying the number of participants. To en-
sure comparability, we kept the number of payments constant across simulations
16In fact the liquidity committed in the simulation with the highest delay cost was used as
the scenario for prompt payment processing.
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Figure 7: Comparison of strategies: a) min liquidity; b) min delays
and maintained the network complete.
We observe that liquidity demand increases with the system size, and the in-
crease is more pronounced the higher the delay costs. For example, the demand
function is unchanged at low delay cost while, for high delay costs, a 50-bank
system requires 215% the liquidity needed in a 15-bank system.
Similar results hold about delays. The relationship between liquidity com-
mitted and delays remains close to exponential irrespective of system size; how-
ever, larger systems experience more delays, for any level of initial liquidity (see
Figure 9).
An intuitive explanation of these phenomena could be the following. First,
note that if the number of participants is increased by a factor x (keeping
turnover constant), the volatility of the balance of each bank is multiplied by
a factor 1/x′ > 1/x - we show this in a moment. Second, suppose that i) the
optimal ai is proportional to the volatility of a bank’s balance δ (i.e. ai = zδ)
17
and that ii) banks post all the same amount of liquidity (i.e. ai = aj). It then
simply follows that the total amount of liquidity increases with the system’s
size: (nx) z δ
x′
> nzδ (here nx is the number of banks in the larger system, and
δ
x′
the corresponding volatility of balances).
The key point is that, if the number of participants is increased (keeping
turnover constant), the volatility of banks balances rises more than proportion-
ally. To see why this is the case, consider the simplified but illustrative situation
17This is exactly the case if a bank chooses ai as to cover z “standard deviations” from the
average balance.
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Figure 8: The effect of system size on the demand for liquidity
where liquidity is abundant, so there are no delays. In this case, a bank’s net
position is the sum of a series of random perturbations (incoming and outgoing
payments), equally likely to affect it positively and negatively. In other words,
a bank’s net position is a random walk, whose value after n perturbations av-
erages zero, with a standard deviation
√
n. By increasing the system size by
a factor x, the orders are distributed over more banks, so the average number
of perturbations for any given time interval is multiplied by 1/x < 1. Accord-
ingly, the standard deviation of the balances at the end of any time interval is
multiplied by 1/x′ =
√
1/x > 1/x.
3.4 Throughput guidelines
Some interbank payment systems have guidelines on payment submission jointly
agreed upon by the system participants18. The rationale for throughput guide-
lines is to induce early settlement in order to e.g. reduce operational risk or
perceived coordination failures among participant. For example, if a large chunk
of payments are settled late in the day, an operational incident would be more
severe as more payments could potentially remain unsettled before close of the
payment system and the financial markets where banks balance their end-of-day
liquidity positions.
18E.g. the FBE (Banking Federation of the European Union 1998) has set guidelines on
the timing of certain TARGET payments. In CHAPS Sterling, members must ensure that on
average (over a calendar month) 50% of its daily value of payments are made by 12 pm and
that 75%, by value, are made by 2.30 pm. (James 2004).
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Figure 9: Impact of throughput guidelines (b) on liquidity
We simulate a particular realization of throughput guidelines by introducing
an additional penalty charge for delays that last longer than one tenth of the
settlement day (i.e. 1000 time units). The penalty charge is set to 64, in order
to sufficiently penalize non-compliance with the rules.
Figure 10 shows the impact of the throughput guidelines on the amount of
liquidity committed by the banks. When delay costs are high, banks already
commit enough liquidity to avoid long delays, so the throughput guidelines
have no effect. They do however, in the case of low delays costs, induce banks
to commit more liquidity. Not surprisingly, this comes at a cost to the banks,
which are forced away from their first-best choice. The increase in costs are
of the order of 70% at the lowest level of delay costs, and 20% at the second
lowest. The payoff comparison is shown in Figure 11.
3.5 Operational incident
Short term outages by banks in the payment system are rare in actual payment
systems, but do take place occasionally. In a typical scenario a participating
bank experiences problems connecting to the system due to temporal unavail-
ability of IT systems or telecommunication facilities. Due to the design of the
payment systems, a disconnected bank can in such situations generally still
receive payments to its account at the central bank, but cannot submit instruc-
tions to pay from its account. Unless other banks stop paying to the troubled
bank, it quickly becomes a liquidity sink, and the liquidity available for settling
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Figure 10: Impact of throughput guidelines (b) on payoffs
payments at other banks is reduced.19
In this set of simulations we ask the question of how much liquidity banks
would wish to commit in such a situation, i.e. what is the impact of an opera-
tional outage on the demand for intraday credit. The banks are assumed to be
unaware of the possible incident, and unable to discriminate among their coun-
terparts, so the intraday liquidity management rule under Eq. 4 is still adopted.
Under these assumptions, we simulated a scenario where a randomly selected
bank can receive, but cannot send payments for the first half of the settlement
day. On average, this means that up to T/2N = 10.000/(2 · 15) ≃ 333 liquidity
units cannot be used by other banks as a source of liquidity20. Depending on
the delay cost, this figure varies between 1900% and 30% of the average total
liquidity injected in the system at the beginning of the day (the first figure being
for the case when both delay cost and liquidity demand are low, and the second
for when costs liquidity demand are both high).
We found that the effect of operational incidents on the demand for liquidity
is highest at a relative delay/liquidity cost ratio of 2 - hence fairly low in the
range; at this point, the increase in intraday credit demand is 144 units, or
an increase of 85%. It should be noted that banks do not compensate for
the full amount of liquidity ”trapped” by the distressed bank, but prefer to
partly make up for that, and partly increase delays. For higher delay costs,
19see e.g. analysis on the impact of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in McAndrews and Potter
(2002), Lacker (2004), and Sorama¨ki et al (2007)
20The shortage of liquidity equals the number of payment orders received by the distressed
bank, and not yet executed until the second half of the day.
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Figure 11: Liquidity - normal circumstances (a) and operational incidents (b)
delays remain approximately unchanged compared to the scenario without the
incident. Finally, when delay costs are lower than liquidity costs (i.e. for a cost
ratio <1), banks prefer to hold about the same amount of liquidity as without
the incident, and experience the delays caused by the reduced liquidity. In
this case, the impact of an operational incident increases both the demand for
liquidity (but less than what was trapped) and delays - more so the one which
is less costly.
4 Summary and conclusions
In this paper we developed an agent-based, adaptive model of banks in a pay-
ment system. Our main focus is on the demand for intraday credit under alterna-
tive scenarios: i) a ”benchmark” scenario, where payments flows are determined
by the initial liquidity, and by an exogenous arrival of payment instructions; ii)
a system where, in addition, throughput guidelines are exogenously imposed iii)
a system subject to operational incidents.
It is well known that the demand for intraday credit is generated by a trade-
off between the costs associated with delaying payments, and liquidity costs.
Simulating the model for different parameter values, we were able to draw with
some precision a liquidity demand function, which turns out to be is an S-shaped
function of the delay / liquidity cost ratio. We also looked at the costs expe-
rienced by the banks, as a function of the model’s parameters. By the process
of individual payoff maximization, banks adjust their demand for liquidity up
19
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Figure 12: Delays as a function of cost ratio (b: incident)
(reducing delays) when delay costs increase, and down (increasing delays), when
they rise. Interestingly however, the absolute delay cost remains approximately
constant when the ratio delay/liquidity costs changes. As expected, the de-
mand for intraday credit is increased by an operational incident. However, this
effect is found to be important only if liquidity is costly compared to delaying
payments. Likewise, throughput guidelines increase the demand for intraday
credit - as banks try to avoid penalties for not adhering to them. In total this
reduces the payoffs of the banks. Nevertheless, throughput guidelines may be
beneficial when additional benefits that are not in the current model are taken
into account (among these, benefits related to reducing operational risk).
This model produces realistic behaviour, suggesting that it may be used to
investigate a wide array of issues in future applications. A number of extensions
are possible. First, alternative specifications for the instruction arrival process
may be applied (see e.g. Beyeler at al. (2006)). Alternatively, one could change
the assumptions on the banks’ network: while the complete network assumption
implicitly adopted here fits well with e.g. the UK CHAPS system, an interesting
question is how other topologies such as a scale free network topology such as in
Fedwire (Sorama¨ki et al.. 2007) would affect the results. Also, different individ-
ual preferences could be investigated. We assumed that banks are risk neutral
and interested in maximising their immediate payoffs; it would be interesting
to verify if the introduction of risk aversion and / or preferences over expected
stream of payoffs may change the results. Finally, more complex behaviour can
be easily studied within our model; for example, the ”pay-as-much-as-you-can”
rule for queuing payments could be replaced by sender limits. Similarly, more
20
sophisticated strategies can be easily modelled, supposing e.g. that banks keep
constant their actions for a number of periods (to gather more data and explore
the environment), instead of exploiting after a fixed amount of time what seems
to be the best action.
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